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FOUR NEW STUDIES 
OF THE CANADIAN
EQUALIZATION SYSTEM
Bev Dahlby, Jim Feehan, Ergete Ferede and Marcelin Joanis†
On January 28 and 29, 2014, the University of Calgary’s School of
Public Policy (SPP) sponsored a conference on equalization
reform. The event provided a forum for current and former federal
and provincial officials, academics from Canadian, Spanish and
German universities, as well as students from the Master of Public
Policy program at the SPP, to explore the issues surrounding this
often-contentious program. Four leading Canadian academics in
the field, Bev Dahlby, Jim Feehan, Ergete Ferede and Marcelin
Joanis, delivered papers at the conference, each advocating a
particular path forward for Canada’s equalization system. This
commentary provides a summary of their proposals and
arguments for reform. 
† The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the anonymous referees.
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An Overview of the Canadian Equalization System
The equalization system has been a cornerstone of intergovernmental fiscal relationships in
Canada since 1957, when the federal government introduced a grant system to reduce the
differences in revenue-generating capacity among the provinces. Ottawa’s commitment was
later formalized when the equalization system was enshrined in the Constitution Act, 1982.
Under the equalization system, provinces with below-standard fiscal capacity receive
equalization grants, while those with per capita fiscal capacity above the standard do not. The
equalization grants are funded out of the general revenues of the federal government. In
2014-15, $16.7 billion in equalization payments will be made to six provinces — Prince
Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba.
Designed to enable provincial governments to provide reasonably comparable levels of public
services for their residents at reasonably comparable tax rates, equalization grants are
determined by a formula based on three sets of key parameters: the national average tax rate,
the per capita standard tax base and a province’s per capita tax base. The national average tax
rate is the ratio of the tax revenue collected by all provinces to the sum of the tax bases of all
provinces for a particular tax source, such as the provincial personal income tax. The
representative average per capita standard tax base for each relevant tax category is determined
as the sum of the tax bases of all the representative “standard”1 provinces divided by their total
population. For each relevant tax category, a province’s own per capita tax base is its tax base
divided by its total population. The equalization grants entitlement for each revenue tax
category is then computed by multiplying the difference between the per capita standard tax
base and the province’s own per capita tax base by the national average tax rate. The resulting
values are then combined for all of the revenue sources to determine if a province has a net per
capita deficiency.2
In the first stage of determining a province’s equalization payment, the total sum of
equalization grant entitlements from all relevant revenue categories is calculated. If this sum is
positive, then the province is categorized as a receiving province and is eligible for an
equalization grant equal to its per capita fiscal deficiency.3 However, if the sum of entitlements
from the categories is negative, the province’s fiscal capacity exceeds the national standard
fiscal capacity and it is not entitled to equalization payments. 
The second stage in determining equalization payments involves caps on individual provinces’
equalization payments and a ceiling on total equalization payments to all provinces. The cap is
intended to prevent a recipient province from having a greater equalization-inclusive fiscal
capacity than a non-recipient province. Thus, for any recipient province, its equalization
entitlement is reduced to the extent that its fiscal capacity, including 100 per cent of its natural
resource revenues plus its equalization entitlement, exceeds the cap. For any recipient 
1 The definition of “standard” provinces has changed a few times in the past. For most years prior to 1982, all ten
provinces were included in the standard. From 1982-2006, however, the federal government used a five-province
standard, consisting of the tax bases of Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Ottawa
once returned to the ten-province standard in 2007. 
2 The one exception is resource revenues. In this case, entitlements are based on fifty per cent of the difference
between the average per capita provincial resource revenue and a province’s per capita resource revenue.
3 The total federal equalization grant for a province is determined by multiplying its per capita fiscal capacity
deficiency by its total population.
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province, equalization entitlement is reduced to the extent that its fiscal capacity, including 100
per cent of its natural resource revenues, plus its equalization entitlement exceeds the cap. In
2009, the federal government imposed a ceiling on total equalization payments and restricted
future growth in total equalization payments to the rate of nominal GDP growth. If total
equalization entitlements exceed the ceiling, then each recipient province’s equalization grant
is reduced by an equal per capita amount.
Canada’s Equalization Formula: Peering Inside the Black Box … and Beyond 
by Jim Feehan
The procedure for computing equalization entitlements is complex and it is sometimes referred
to by its critics as a black box. Feehan’s paper sheds light on this black box by describing the
evolution of the equalization system, particularly the major changes that were introduced in
2007 following the publication of the Expert Panel report.4 In Feehan’s view, the most
problematic change was the implementation of a ceiling on total equalization payments. While
the ceiling was introduced to make federal expenditures under the program more predictable
and affordable, it has meant that total equalization payments have become less and less
reflective of the fiscal disparities across provinces. The fundamental principle that payments
should rise and fall alongside increases and decreases in fiscal disparities is violated by this
allocation rule. Feehan estimates that the ceiling has resulted in a cumulative reduction of
$10.9 billion in equalization payments, with the largest reduction (more than $4.5 billion)
occurring in 2010/11, but most recently in 2013/14 the reduction was only $0.37 billion.
While Feehan supports the idea of eliminating the ceiling on total equalization grants, he
acknowledges that the federal government will have to do something if the disparities in the
fiscal capacities of the provinces continue to grow, resulting in mushrooming equalization
payments over the long term. His solution would be to reduce the Canada Health Transfer
(CHT) and Canada Social Transfer (CST) payments to the provincial governments with above
average fiscal capacities according to some proportional or progressive scale, with a limit on
the maximum fraction the grants could be reduced, say 50 per cent.5 The effect of this change
would be to shift the equalization claw-back away from recipient to non-recipient provinces.6
The inclusion rate for natural resource revenues in the equalization calculation is one of the
most important and controversial aspects of the system (the current rate is 50 per cent). The
asymmetric treatment of resource revenues is not a new phenomenon. Throughout the history
of the program, natural resource revenues have been treated differently from the other major
sources of tax revenue. The inclusion of natural resource revenues in the equalization grant
system has always presented difficulties because:
• natural resources, especially high-revenue yielding oil and gas, are very unevenly
distributed across the provinces compared to other revenue sources, which drives up
equalization entitlements;
4 Expert Panel on Equalization and Territorial Formula Financing, Achieving a National Purpose: Putting Equalization
Back on Track (Ottawa: Department of Finance Canada, 2006). 
5 In 2014-15, Ottawa transferred $32 billion to the provinces through the Canada Health Transfer and another $12.5
billion through the Canada Social Transfer. 
6 This assumes that to start with the per-capita Canada Health Transfer and Canada Social Transfer are adequate,
which is an important but separate issue of vertical fiscal imbalance. 
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• the provinces own the natural resources within their borders, and the Constitution, gives
them the sole right to impose royalties on them, so the federal government is excluded from
this source of natural resource revenue; and
• determining natural resource fiscal capacity is fraught with major measurement problems.
As a result, since 2007, resource revenues rather than proxies for fiscal capacity have been
used to calculate equalization entitlements. Doing so, however, creates the perverse
incentive for recipient provinces to lower their taxes/royalties on natural resources to
benefit residents while being cushioned by increased equalization entitlements.
Another controversial issue is the treatment of remittances from provincial Crown corporations
engaged in resource extraction, especially those of the provincially owned hydro corporations.
The federal government has adopted the Expert Panel recommendation that the remittances of
hydro-electric Crown corporations be included in the natural resource revenue category in
calculating equalization payments. Feehan notes that remittances from other provincially
owned commercial enterprises are included in the Business Income Tax category for
equalization purposes, and he recommends that the remittances of hydro corporations should
be removed from the natural resource revenues category and included in the Business Income
Tax category. Going beyond equalization, Feehan suggests that it may be time to reconsider the
practice of exempting commercial Crown corporations from federal income tax.
Another issue concerning provincially owned hydro corporations is the under-pricing of
electricity rates by charging low water rentals and/or realizing low returns on hydro
corporation capital. This benefits provincial households and businesses while increasing a
province’s equalization entitlements relative to a situation where market-determined prices are
charged and the economic rents from hydro developments flow into the provincial
government’s general revenues. According to data presented by Feehan, three traditional
equalization recipients, Newfoundland and Labrador, Quebec and Manitoba, collected $0.07,
$3.36 and $3.45 per MWh in water power rentals respectively, while British Columbia and
Ontario collected $8.40 and $5.00 respectively. Feehan argues that it is now time to deal with
this issue because the development of competitive wholesale electricity markets in North
America has resulted in prices that can serve as indicators of the value of electricity. Also, with
the current low natural gas prices, wholesale electricity prices have softened, and therefore, the
transition to market prices for valuing potential hydro revenues will not cause an immediate
dramatic shift in equalization entitlements, especially if water rentals remain subject to the 50
per cent inclusion rule for resource revenues. 
Revenues from user fees are currently not included in the calculation of provincial
governments’ fiscal capacities. Feehan argues that municipal governments’ user fees are a
substitute for municipal property taxes, which are included in the equalization formula, and
therefore, municipal user fees should be included in the calculation of a province’s fiscal
capacity. He argues that this reform is completely feasible since the user fee revenues are
known and the same tax base, residential property values, would continue to be used. The only
implication of including municipal user fees would be an increase in the national average tax
rate for the property tax revenue category, and therefore an increase in the national average tax
rate. Feehan argues, however, that other provincial user fees, such as university tuition, should
not be included in the equalization formula, because provincial fees are tied to a gamut of
activities, making it inherently difficult to identify the appropriate base let alone measure it
accurately, and provincial governments’ reliance on user fees is relative small. As a practical
matter, therefore, adding provincial user fees would likely be of negligible significance. 
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While the equalization system reduces the differences in the provinces’ revenue-raising
capacities, it does not address the differences among the provinces in terms of the cost and
needs of providing public services to their respective populations. The feasibility of
incorporating costs and needs has recently been demonstrated by work conducted by Gusen.7
His prototype study for the fiscal year 2008-09 shows that while the overall total of
equalization payments would decrease only slightly, its allocation would change greatly,
largely to Ontario’s benefit and Quebec’s detriment. Given the expenditures associated with the
provinces’ areas of responsibility, Feehan argues that extending equalization entitlements to
include expenditure needs and costs would be akin to opening Pandora’s Box, both with
respect to the open-ended nature of provincial spending and provincial government autonomy
in their areas of expenditure responsibility. In his view, a preferable approach is for the federal
government to adjust the CHT and the CST to reflect relevant demographic and other
considerations that affect needs within the set of provincial programs that these grants are
intended to help support.
Finally, Feehan notes that a number of commentators have argued that recipient provinces
receive too much equalization and that this is damaging to the national economy. However, this
“over-equalization hypothesis” has been challenged in a recent study by McMillan who
concludes that equalization spending has not been rising relative to overall federal spending or
as a percentage of national GDP.8 Furthermore, while recipient provinces tend to have higher
tax rates, overall per capita spending by recipient and non-recipient provinces is roughly the
same. Feehan concludes that worries about over-equalization are overstated, arguing that
concerns about excessive expenditures by recipient provinces has yet to be borne out.
Moreover, spending on equalization has not changed much relative to national income or total
federal spending, indicating that if there is over-equalization, it is not a growing problem. 
Reforming Equalization: Balancing Efficiency, Entitlement and Ownership 
by Bev Dahlby
Dahlby addresses a number of the same policy issues as Feehan. He argues that any reforms to
the equalization system have to balance concerns about the “efficiency” effects that arise from
federal financing of the transfer and the incentive effects on provincial fiscal policies, the
entitlement to reasonably comparable public services at reasonably comparable levels of
taxation and the “ownership” of natural resources by provincial governments. Achieving a fine
balance of these goals is not easy, and inevitably there will be differences in the emphasis that
commentators and government officials place on each. 
Dahlby evaluates five recent proposals for reform of the equalization system: 
• Lowering the inclusion rate for natural resource revenues; 
• Removing the ceiling on total equalization payments to the recipient provinces; 
7 Peter Gusen, “Expenditure Needs: Equalization’s Other Half,” Mowat Centre 46. (Toronto: Mowat Centre, School of
Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto, 2012). 
8 Melville L. Millan, “Alberta and ’Equalization’: Separating Fact from Fiction or Sorting Out Some Implications and
Options in Canadian Fiscal Federalism,” Information Bulletin, Number 155 (Edmonton: School of Business/Western
Centre for Economic Research, University of Alberta, 2012).
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• Exempting resource revenues deposited in provincial sovereign wealth funds from the
calculation of a province’s fiscal capacity;
• Basing the CHT and the CST on the fiscal capacities of the provinces; and
• Incorporating cost and needs factors in the calculation of equalization entitlements.
Dahlby argues that lowering the inclusion rate for resource revenues from 50 per cent to 25 per
cent would increase the incentive for provinces to develop and tax their natural resource bases.
Halving the inclusion rate would also decrease the financial pressure resource development
places on Ottawa vis-à-vis equalization, helping, in particular, to alleviate the problem that
arises when higher equalization are not match by comparable increases in federal tax revenues. 
Dahlby’s proposal to reduce the inclusion rate is connected to his proposal to eliminate the
ceiling on total equalization grants. Introduced by the federal government in 2009 to limit its
financial commitments as a result of increases in provincial resource revenues, the ceiling fixes
total equalization payments to the recipient provinces. This limits risk sharing from provincial
fiscal shocks. If the fiscal capacity of one recipient province goes down, the equalization
payments to the other recipient provinces are reduced, while federal taxpayers in the non-
recipient provinces are not directly affected. The removal of the ceiling on total equalization
entitlements would help to spread the burden of the adverse provincial fiscal shocks to all
federal taxpayers in Canada. If the elimination of the ceiling were combined with a reduction
in the resource revenue inclusion rate from 50 per cent to 25 per cent, the efficiency and
effectiveness of the equalization program would be improved while maintaining approximately
the same level of total equalization transfers to the provinces.
Exempting resource revenues that are deposited in provincial sovereign wealth funds from the
calculation of equalization entitlements would reduce fluctuations in equalization entitlements,
but it would not reduce total entitlements in present value terms. It would also involve complex
calculations if it were applied to all forms of savings by the provinces, such as debt reduction,
and would not alter the resource-rich provinces’ incentives to save more of their resource
revenues. It is for these reasons that Dahlby argues this proposal should be rejected. 
As noted in Feehan’s paper, there have been proposals to reduce the CHT and the CST to
provinces with above average fiscal capacities. Dahlby argues that this proposal should be
rejected because it would reduce the incentive of the resource-rich provinces to develop and
tax their resources. More importantly, it would negate the purpose of these block transfers,
which is to reduce the vertical fiscal imbalance between the federal and the provincial
governments. 
Also, as addressed by Feehan, the recent work by Gusen shows that addressing variations in
costs and needs in the computation of the equalization entitlements seems feasible.9 Dahlby
argues that while there are conceptual and practical problems with incorporating costs and
needs elements in the equalization system, such problems also exist with the measurement of
fiscal capacity. The equalization system has managed to overcome — or in some cases, to
overlook — these problems to create a system that, while far from perfect, functions
reasonably well. For these reasons, Dahlby argues incorporating needs and costs elements into
the equalization system should be placed high on the reform agenda.
9 Gusen, “Expenditure Needs.” 
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The Incentive Effects of Equalization Grants on Fiscal Policy 
by Ergete Ferede 
The Canadian equalization system was designed to address provincial fiscal disparities by
compensating provinces when their per capita tax base is below the standard per capita tax
base. However, as noted by Feehan and Dahlby, the equalization grant system may affect the
provinces’ tax and expenditure policies by creating incentives to raise or lower certain tax rates
or alter their pattern of spending in order to increase their equalization grants. For example, a
large province, such as Quebec, can increase its equalization entitlements by increasing its tax
rate on those tax bases where its per capita base is below the standard per capita base and
lowering its tax rate on those tax bases where its per capita base exceeds the standard per
capita base. Furthermore, the equalization grant formula gives all recipient provinces an
incentive to raise their tax rates because any decline in the tax base, due to tax avoidance or tax
evasion, is offset to some degree by higher equalization payments. This reduces the perceived
cost of raising tax rates, creating an artificial incentive for provinces to raise their tax rates. 
Equalization grants may also influence the composition of provincial governments’
expenditures by discouraging spending on activities, such as education, transportation and
communication and industrial development that enhance their fiscal capacities and thereby
reduce their equalization grants. In this way, recipient provinces’ expenditures may be biased
towards spending on consumptive programs, such as social services, recreation and culture. 
An evidence-based assessment of the incentive effects of the equalization program can help
resolve some of these concerns. Ferede conducted a detailed econometric analysis of the effects
of the federal equalization grant program on provincial governments’ tax and spending policies
over the period 1981-2008. The main results from his statistical analysis of the provincial
responses to equalization grants are as follows: 
• Equalization grants provide recipient provincial governments with an incentive to raise their
business and personal income tax rates. If a $100 block grant, such as the CHT that is not
tied a province’s fiscal capacity, were substituted for the equivalent equalization grant, a
recipient province’s business income tax rate would decline by 2.6 percentage points and its
personal income tax rates would decline by 0.26 percentage points. 
• A one-dollar increase in per capita equalization grant is associated with a $0.21 increase in
per capita provincial expenditure on health services, a $0.35 increase in per capita
provincial expenditure on resource conservation and industrial assistance, a $0.05 increase
in per capita spending on the environment and a $0.058 increase in spending on housing.
Ferede concludes that the equalization system increases business and personal income taxes in
the recipient provinces. Some commentators argue this is a result of recipient governments
being compensated when their tax bases decline in response to higher tax rates, which allows
them to underestimate the true deadweight cost associated with higher tax rates. However, the
incentive to raise tax rates under the equalization system may offset the competitive pressures to
lower taxes to attract inter-provincially mobile tax bases, and therefore, counteract tax
competition that reduces the ability of all provinces to raise revenues for needed public services.
Consequently, the policy conclusion to be drawn from Ferede’s analysis is not straightforward,
with further research being required to determine the balance between reducing the harmful tax
competition and exposing provinces to the full cost of their tax policies.
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The Politics of Chequebook Federalism: Can Electoral Considerations Affect
Federal-Provincial Transfers? 
by Marcelin Joanis
Given the important role federal transfers plays in financing provincial governments, it is not
surprising that many changes to the equalization and other major grant programs are politically
motivated. It has been argued that the proliferation of electorally motivated side deals between
the federal government and some provincial governments may undermine the equalization
program’s ability to equalize fiscal capacities. Consequently, it is important to have a careful
empirical analysis of the extent to which changes in the level and distribution of federal
transfers to the provinces has been affected by political variables.
Joanis argues that changes to Canadian fiscal arrangements are the result of an ongoing trade-
off between three oft-conflicting objectives:
• Respecting the equalization program’s constitutional principle;
• Ensuring the political acceptability of all transfer programs; and
• Respecting the federal government’s budget constraint.
As Canada’s centre of political gravity has shifted westward over the past decade, the second
and third objectives have aligned themselves to limit the extent of redistribution through
federal-provincial transfers.
Joanis uses data from 1982-2012 to investigate the relationship between federal and provincial
electoral variables and changes in a province’s federal transfer revenues. The main variable of
interest is the provincial vote share of the federal governing party. The econometric model
indicates that a province’s share of total transfers increases as the provincial vote share of the
party in power in Ottawa increases, an effect that has been weaker under the Liberals than it is
under the Conservatives. On average over the period, a province’s real per capita total federal
transfers were higher when the Conservatives’ share of the vote in that province was higher. 
Joanis’s analysis of equalization grants indicates that the primary factor is the province’s fiscal
capacity with lower capacity resulting in higher grants. The provincial vote share of the federal
party in power does not have a statistically significant effect on the province’s share of
equalization grants. The social transfers, currently the CHT and the CST, provide the strongest
empirical evidence that provincial vote shares for the federal party in power has a positive
effect on distribution and levels of these transfers. 
In light of these statistical results, Joanis discusses three potential reforms to attenuate political
distortions in the allocation of federal transfers. First, an independent body could be established
to manage the fiscal arrangement programs to reduce political influence on the allocations of
funds. Second, the equalization program could be partially pre-funded with a predetermined
federal contribution separate from the federal government’s budget. This would have the
benefit of isolating the program from cyclical federal cost-cutting decisions while also making
the program’s funding more predictable for the federal government. Third, equalization
entitlements could be based on a macro approach (e.g., using real per capita provincial output)
rather than the current procedure of trying to calculate measures of fiscal capacity for
individual tax sources. Adopting a simpler, less contentious approach to allocating equalization
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payments would improve the transparency of the program, eliminate the continuing technical
debates on the treatment of various special cases, such as hydro revenues and property taxes,
and reduce opportunities for politically motivated side-deals.
❖ ❖ ❖
Although the authors of the four papers presented at the conference focus on different aspects
of the equalization program, several common themes emerged. First, both Dahlby and Feehan
deplore the ceiling that has been imposed because it negates the fundamental principle that
payments should rise when fiscal disparities increase. Furthermore, the ceiling places the
burden of dealing with provincial fiscal shocks on the residents of the recipient provinces.
While agreeing that the ceiling is problematic, Dahlby and Feehan diverge on their preferred
solution. Whereas Dahlby favours reducing the percentage of resource revenues that are
included in the calculation of equalization entitlements, Feehan proposes reducing the CHT and
the CST for the provinces with above average fiscal capacities. 
A second common theme concerns the equalization system’s incentive effects on the fiscal
policies of the provinces. Part of the reason Dahlby advocates a lower inclusion rate for
resource revenues is that it would reduce disincentive effects for the provinces to develop and
tax resource revenues. Feehan links the under-pricing of electricity by provincially owned
hydro companies to a strategy that benefits provincial consumers of electricity while increasing
their equalization entitlements. Ferede’s econometric study indicates that the equalization
system has provided recipient provincial governments with an incentive to raise their business
and personal income tax rates. 
A third common theme is that changes to the system have too often been driven by short-term
financial considerations and political expediency, which has resulted in a departure from a
principle-based approach to calculating equalization grants. Joanis’s econometric study
demonstrates the impact of political factors on the distribution of federal transfers to the
provinces. Institutional reforms to make the equalization system more transparent and shield it
from short-term political and economic events are worthy of further consideration.
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